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CASENOTES

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor: The
Supreme Court Defines the Standard for
Settlement Class Action Certification

In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,' a case stemming from the
asbestos litigation crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the certification criteria for settlement-only
class actions under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule
23").
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Personal injury and wrongful death suits resulting from asbestos
exposure began to appear in the 1960s.2 Asbestos cases escalated in
number throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1986 alone the filing rate
of new asbestos cases in federal and state courts jumped from five
hundred new cases per month to two thousand new cases per month?
The enormous number of asbestos cases entering the judicial system
resulted in (1) extreme financial burdens that threatened to completely
bankrupt manufacturers; (2) excessive expansion of state and federal

1. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
2. Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
3. Id.
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dockets, which created substantial delays in processing claims; (3)
unwieldy transaction costs that made it impractical for plaintiffs to bring
suits; and (4) erratic decisions issued by courts in different jurisdictions
with similar fact patterns.'
Responding to the burden on the state and federal judicial systems, in
1987 the Federal Judicial Center convened a conference of judges and
both plaintiff and defense counsel to discuss a means of resolving the
asbestos litigation crisis.6 The report declared that a legislative
response to the asbestos problem was necessary, but this prompting from
the conference received no response. A second judicial conference was
convened in 1990.6
As a result of continued efforts by the judiciary to find a global
resolution to the crisis, all federal personal injury asbestos litigation
pending in 1991 was transferred to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for coordinated and consolidated
pretrial proceedings.7 Twenty defendant manufacturers represented by
the Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR") entered into extensive
negotiations with members of plaintiffs' steering committee! Negotiations focused on the development of a national "alternative resolution
mechanism" that would provide a means of handling future asbestos
claims against defendants.9 Once an agreement was reached between
CCR and plaintiffs' attorneys, defendants proceeded to settle all pending
claims."
On January 15, 1993, a complaint, an answer, and a stipulation for
settlement were filed simultaneously by plaintiffs and defendants."
On the same day, plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint motion for
conditional class certification seeking temporary certification under Rule
23(b)(3) for the limited purpose of seeking approval of the proposed
settlement. 2
The proposed class consisted of all persons who had not filed an
asbestos-related lawsuit against any of the named defendants as of the
date the class action commenced but "who (1) had been ex-

4. Id. A 1984 Rand Corporation study found that only thirty-seven to thirty-nine
percent of money paid by asbestos defendants went to victims, with sixty-one to sixty-three
percent going to transaction costs. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 264.
7. Id. at 265.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 266.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 257.
12. Id.
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posed--occupationally or through the occupational exposure of a spouse
or household member-to asbestos or products containing asbestos
attributable to a [named] defendant, or (2) whose spouse or family
member had been so exposed."13 The class would include persons who
had already suffered injury as well as those who had been exposed to
asbestos but had not yet been diagnosed with an asbestos-related
injury"' The class would number in the tens of thousands with
members being given the option to voluntarily "opt-out" of the suit. 5
The district court found that the settlement was fair, that the court's
jurisdiction was properly invoked, and that representation and notice
were adequate. 6 In granting certification, the court noted that Rule
23 requirements for class certification were "often more readily satisfied
in the settlement context because the issues for resolution by the court
are more limited than in the litigation context." 7
In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that each of the Rule 23(a) requirements and the appropriate Rule 23(b)
requirements must be satisfied "as if the action [was] going to be
litigated."" The court stated that the settlement agreement should not
be taken into account in evaluating a class for certification.' 9 Applying
this standard, the court ruled that the proposed class did not meet four
of the Rule 23 requirements. 20
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, holding
that the proposed class did not meet the predominance or the adequacy
of representation requirements of Rule 23.21 In affirming the Third
Circuit, the Supreme Court stated that a settlement must be taken into
account when determining the propriety of class certification but that
taking the settlement into account does not relieve plaintiffs of their
obligation to meet the Rule 23 requirements.2 2

13. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
14. Id. at 2240.
15. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 261.
16. Id at 333-34.

17. Id. at 315. See also 117 S. Ct. at 2242. The objectors appealed the order of the
district court judge enjoining all class members from commencing any asbestos-related
actions in any state or federal court. Id.
18. Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996).
19. Id. at 617-18.
20. Id. at 617.
21. 117 S. Ct. at 2247-52.
22. Id. at 2248.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Rule 23, which governs the treatment of class actions in federal courts,
sets out requirements that must be satisfied by parties seeking
certification as a class.2" Rule 23(a) lists four threshold requirements
that must be met for a party to be certified as a class:
(1) numerosity (a "class [so large] that joinder of all members

is impracticable"); (2) commonality ("questions of law or fact common
to the class"); (3) typicality (named parties' claims or defenses "are
typical ... of the class"); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class").2
In order to be certified as a class, a party must meet not only the
requirements of Rule 23(a) but also the requirements of one of the
categories under Rule 23(b). The Rule 23(b)(3) class action is designed
to cover cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense and promote "'uniformity of decisions as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing
about other undesirable results."'25 Rule 23(b)(3) creates a class action
for plaintiffs seeking damages rather than injunctive or declaratory
relief. The Rule 23(b)(3) class action is "designed to secure judgments
binding on all class members" except those who voluntarily opt-out."6
Rule 23(b)(3) states that a class action may be maintained if the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and if
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
actionY

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 727 (4th Cir. 1989).
117 S. Ct. at 2245.
Id. at 2246 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 23(bX3) advisory committee's note).
Id. at 2245.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the settlement-only class
action has become a "stock device."' Unlike the traditional class action
in which a party seeks certification so that an issue or claim may be
litigated by a class of plaintiffs, a settlement class action is an action in
which the plaintiffs and defendants move for class certification solely for
the purpose of settlement. 29 No litigation is contemplated.' Settlement class actions have become particularly popular in the mass tort
arena. This mechanism allows defendant manufacturers to negotiate
with selected plaintiffs' attorneys to reach a settlement agreement, and
to bring the settlement to the court for approval." In doing so,
manufacturers are able to define the persons to whom they will be
required to pay future damages. 2 Furthermore, these manufacturers
are able to limit future damages by narrowing the scope of causes of
action that may be brought and by establishing a preset amount that
may be awarded for each particular cause of action."
Rule 23(e) states: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
such manner as the court directs. ' Typically, application of Rule 23(e)
takes place in a "fairness" hearing in which the court considering
certification and the settlement will examine evidence provided by the
parties and make a determination on the fairness of the settlement
agreement.3 5 Prior to Amchem, the debate in federal courts had been
over whether the fairness of the settlement under Rule 23(e) should
influence the decision to certify the class and, if so, how much weight the
fairness of the settlement should be given.'
In re Bendectin3 7 represents the first time that a district court
granted class certification for settlement purposes in a mass tort
In re Bendectin involved a proposed class of plaintiffs
action."
claiming injuries suffered from the use of the pharmaceutical Bendectin,
which plaintiffs alleged caused birth defects and stillborn births in

28.

117 S. Ct. at 2247.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id
Id.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 330.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 294-95.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
157 F.R.D. at 334-35.
117 S. Ct. at 2247.
102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
Robins, 880 F.2d at 739.
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mothers ingesting the drug. 39 The district court certified the class,
stating that the traditional court system was unequipped to handle mass
tort litigation "in a conventional manner without materially depleting
the judicial resources available for all other litigation."' The costs,
according to the court, were high, both in terms of delay in the
"overburdened" federal system and in expenses to the parties litigating
the cases. 41 The court noted that resolution of disputes does not
necessarily require trial but that parties might be assisted in reaching
a prompt and equitable disposition of the entire problem through a
"limited use" of Rule 23.42

Even though the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district
court decision to certify the class, it pointed out that several cases
involving issues other than mass torts had already been certified for
settlement only.' In finding that the class in In re Bendectin had not
met all of the Rule 23 requirements to its satisfaction, the court found
that it was still "conceivable" that a mass tort case might be certifiable
for settlement purposes only."
All courts of appeals have now recognized the utility of Rule 23(b)(3)
settlement classes. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Amchem,
however, courts were divided on how to apply the Rule 23 requirements.4' The approach favored in most federal circuits before Amchern
was to look to the settlement agreement as a basis for meeting Rule 23
requirements. This was conveniently accomplished during the Rule 23(e)
fairness inquiry. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re A.H.
Robins Co.' noted that Rule 23 was intended to be applied with a high
degree of flexibility and that "if not a ground for certification per se,
certainly settlement should be a factor, and an important factor, to be
considered when determining certification."
The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court decision to certify a class of Dalkon Shield
plaintiffs for settlement purposes based on, among other factors, the
support of voting members of the class for the settlement agreement.48

39.
40.
41.

102 F.R.D. at 240 n.2.
Id. at 240.
Id.

42. Id.
43. In re Bendectin, 749 F.2d 300, 305 n.10 (6th Cir. 1984).
44. Id.

45.
46.
47.
48.

117 S. Ct. at 2247.
880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
Id at 740.
Id. at 744.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals went even further when it stated
in In re Asbestos Litigation49 that a court must consider the terms of a
settlement in determining whether to certify a class because in the
settlement class context, common issues among class members arise
from the settlement itself.5" In In re Asbestos Litigation, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court certification and approval of a
settlement for future asbestos victims."' The Fifth Circuit stated that
it was bound to follow established precedent, which held that "the
district court can and should look at the terms of a settlement in front
of it as part of its certification inquiry." 2 However, the Fifth Circuit
went on to state that it "would adopt this rule even if [it was] not bound
by precedent because it enhances the ability of district courts to make
informed certification decisions."3
Likewise, the Second Circuit" and the Eighth Circuit 5 have found
the settlement agreement itself to be a basis for satisfying Rule 23
requirements. Only the Third Circuit, prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Amchem, had refused to consider the terms of the settlement
in determining the propriety of class certification."
In In re General Motors Corp.,"7 the Third Circuit held that even
though settlement classes are cognizable under Rule 23, they must meet
the same requirements as those intended for litigation." In this
multidistrict products liability action against a manufacturer of pick-up
trucks based on alleged defects in the fuel tanks, the court refused to
concede that a lower standard may be applied in the settlement class
action context. 59 The court set aside the district court certification

49. 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
50. Id. at 975.
51. Id. at 993.
52. Id. at 975,
53. Id. See also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 176 (5th Cir. 1979)
(certifying for settlement only a class that it had previously refused to certify for trial, thus
implying that the standards for certifying a class for settlement only are different from
those certifying a class for litigation).
54. Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that a settlement
agreement provided the basis for satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(4Ys adequacy ofrepresentation
standard because it demonstrated that the interests of the parties were not antagonistic).
55. White v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the adequacy of representation requirement was satisfied because significant benefits were
received by members of the class under the settlement).
56. In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d at 975.
57. 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
58. Id. at 799.
59. Id. at 800.
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order and settlement approval because the district court failed to make
findings that the class complied with Rule 2 3 .®
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Amchem the Supreme Court, while affirming the judgment of the
Third Circuit, stated that a settlement is relevant to class certification."' When a settlement-only class certification is sought, however,
the court must still apply the standards set out under Rule 23(a) and (b)
as if the suit was going to be litigated.62 In applying this trial-ready
standard, the Court found that the proposed class.failed to satisfy the
predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3) and the adequacy of representation standard of Rule 23(a)(4).6
In explaining why Rule 23(e) was not the appropriate standard for
evaluating a proposed class for certification, the Court began with an
analysis of the intent behind the rule. The Court described Rule 23(e)
as one that only prevents a class action from being dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court and without notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise to class members.6" This fairness
standard was intended, according to the Court, as an additional
requirement, referring to classes that were already qualified for
certification.6 It was never intended by the drafters as a superseding
direction."
The Supreme Court held that the safeguards provided by Rule 23(a)
and (b) are necessary in the settlement context as well as the litigation
context.6 7 First, Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements protect absent class
members by preventing class certification dependent on the court's
overall impression of the fairness of the settlement." Second, if a Rule
23(e) fairness inquiry was the controlling standard for class certification
despite the impossibility of litigation, the Court reasoned, both class
counsel and the court would be disadvantaged.6,9 Counsel would be
unable to press for a better offer by threatening litigation, and the court

60. Id.
61. 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
62. Id (noting that of Rule 23's requirements, only trial management concerns may be
set aside in deciding on the propriety of class certification).
63. Id. at 2248-52.
64. I4 at 2248.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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would have
to evaluate bargains without the benefit of adversarial
70
litigation.
In applying the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements to Amchem as if the
case was going to be litigated, the Court found the class did not meet the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard. 71 According to the Court, this
standard could not be satisfied by pointing to the shared experience of
asbestos exposure, a common interest in receiving prompt and fair
compensation, or a common interest in fair settlement.72 The Rule
23(b)(3) inquiry should focus instead, noted the Court, on the legal or
factual questions that qualify each individual member's 74case as a
genuine controversy.73 Such questions pre-exist settlement.
In explaining its reasoning, the Court pointed out that while Rule
23(e) is designed to protect unnamed class members from unjust or
unfair settlement resulting when class representatives grow fainthearted or choose to compromise to their own benefit, Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.7" The Court
found that the number of individual questions among class members and
the significance of those questions prevented any overarching questions
related to the settlement from satisfying the predominance standard.76
The Court also found that the Amchem class failed to satisfy the
adequacy of representation requirement enunciated in Rule 23(a)(4).7 7
The purpose of the adequacy of representation standard is to "uncover
conflicts of interest between named party representatives and the class
they seek to represent.7 ' The Court noted that when, as in Amchem,
differences within a class justify the creation of subclasses, representatives must understand their obligations to the specific subgroup they

70. Id
71. Id. at 2250.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 2235.
74. Id. at 2250.

75. Id. at 2249.
76. Id. The Court cited the findings of the court of appeals that

[c]lass members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for
different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some
class members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural
changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from
mesothelioma.... Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that
complicates the causation inquiry.
Id. at 2250 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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represent.79 The Court held that the interests of the members of the
Amchem class were not adequately aligned to justify inclusion in a single
class.' In particular, the interest of members with current asbestosrelated illnesses in need of immediate financial remedy would be very
different from the interest of "exposure-only" members looking to
establish a reserve from which future claims could be made.8 These
differences would necessarily place very different pressures on the
named plaintiffs, and the Court did not believe the named plaintiffs
were aware of their responsibilities to the class members.8 2
The Court closed its analysis by briefly addressing its concern over
settlement notice. Because the predominance and the adequacy of
representation issues were dispositive, the Court did not rule on whether
notice of the settlement to class members was sufficient.8 8 Like the
Third Circuit, however, the Court expressed concern over whether "class
action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be
given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous.'
In dissenting, Justice Breyer outlined five areas in which he thought
the majority had erred.' First, Justice Breyer noted that the need for
settlement in Amchem, which involved hundreds of thousands of
lawsuits, was greater than the Court opinion suggested.'
Second,
according to Justice Breyer, more weight should be given to settlementrelated issues in determining whether common issues predominated. 7
Third, the Justice questioned whether the Court was correct in secondguessing the district court on the adequacy of representation determination without first having the court of appeals consider it under the
enunciated standard.8 Fourth, Justice Breyer expressed uncertainty
about "the tenor of an opinion that seems to suggest the settlement is
unfair," which the Justice claimed was expressly a district court duty.8 9
Finally, Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's suggestions that
"notice" was
inadequate in the absence of further review by the court of
0
appeals.9

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86,
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 2251.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2252.
Id.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The settlement was relevant, Justice Breyer noted, because common
features and interests among class members, such as exposure to
asbestos and an interest in prompt and fair compensation, were likely
to be important in the proceeding that would ensue.9 A proceeding
would not be a trial but would instead focus primarily upon whether or
not the proposed settlement fairly and properly satisfied the interests of
the class members.92 Because he thought that the Third Circuit had
not reviewed the district court decision with the settlement in mind,
Justice Breyer stated that the case should have been sent back to the
court of appeals for review under the correct standard."
IV

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court decision in Amchem should result at a minimum
in a decrease in forum-shopping among defendants in mass tort actions.
Prior to the decision in Amchem, parties could choose a forum in which
to seek class certification based on the particular standard applied in the
jurisdiction. Now, however, there is a uniform standard by which each
proposed class must be evaluated and "undiluted, even heightened
attention" must be given to class action proposals in the settlement-only
context." This standard should manifest itself in a much closer
examination of the factors that qualify a class for adjudication by
representation. When individual issues that would necessarily be
examined by the courts in a trial predominate, the class will no longer
be certified.
It is just as likely that there will be a reduction in the number of class
actions certified for settlement only. Without a relaxed standard, as
applied in In re Bendectin,95 or the flexibility to mold certification
criteria to the circumstances of the individual case, as described in In re
A.H. Robins Co.," courts may find themselves without the tools
necessary to justify class certification, particularly in the mass tort,
settlement-only context. In this more stringent context, individual
differences among class members make it extremely difficult to satisfy
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard as well as the Rule 23(a)(4)
adequacy of representation standard.97

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2248.
102 F.R.D. at 240.
880 F.2d at 740.
In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 814.
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In addition, classes that are certified by the courts under the Amchem
standard will be more narrowly defined than those certified prior to the
Supreme Court decision. Under the predominance standard as applied
by the Supreme Court, classes will be required to show that common
issues are sufficient to warrant adjudication by representation just as if
the case were going to trial." Likewise, named plaintiffs will be
required to demonstrate that they are aware of their responsibilities to
members of the subgroups to which they belong and that the differences
among members of the proposed class do not create conflicts of interest
that would prevent the named plaintiffs from representing all members
of their class." When there are individual issues related to proof of
injury, proof of causation, and degree of injury, and when these
individual issues are complicated by variations in the pertinent laws
from state to state, it will be extremely difficult to meet Rule 23(a) and
(b) requirements unless the class is narrowly defined."
Legislative action designed to encourage settlement classes is a
possible alternative to anticipated reductions in class certifications. As
the court in In re General Motors indicated, a statutory scheme with
stated principles and procedures to guide the trial court in certifying
classes specifically for settlement may replace the current rules, allowing
for more ready settlement.0 1
There currently exists a proposed amendment to Rule 23 that "would
expressly authorize settlement class certification, in conjunction with a
motion by the settling parties for Rule 23(b)(3) certification, 'even though
the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes of
trial.'"'" Until action is taken on the amendment, however, courts
must operate under the current rule, which requires parties to satisfy
the Rule 23 standards as if the case were going to trial.' 3
JIMMY WHITE

98.

117 S. Ct. at 2249.

99. Id.
100. Id.

101. 55 F.3d at 814.
102. 117 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting proposed amendment to FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)). See

also JudicialConferenceApproves Single Change To FederalRule GoverningClass Action
Suits, 66 U.S.L.W. 2182 (Sept. 30, 1997) (discussing a proposal that would "allow a trial
court to certify a class for settlement purposes only" in conformance with Amchem).
103. 117 S. Ct. at 2247.

Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown:
Nepotism, Skepticism, and Causation Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983

In Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown,1 the Supreme Court
held that a municipality incurs liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section
1983")2 for failing to screen the background of a job applicant only when
the "plainly obvious consequence of the [hiring] decision" is that the
employee is likely to deprive citizens of specific federal rights.3
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In May 1991 Jill Brown and her husband were driving from Texas to
their home in Bryan County, Oklahoma. Just after crossing over into
Oklahoma, the Browns encountered a police checkpoint. Mr. Brown, the
driver, decided to avoid the checkpoint and return to Texas. 4 Two
Bryan County sheriff's deputies observed the Browns' car turn around
and subsequently gave chase. After a short pursuit, the deputies
stopped the car and ordered the Browns to exit at gunpoint. Apparently
believing the Browns were not moving quickly enough, Reserve Deputy
Stacey Burns began to pull Jill Brown from the car using an "arm bar"

1. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1997). This frequently litigated code section provides in
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

id.
3. 117 S. Ct. at 1392. Municipality is used to refer to any governmental entity below
the state level.
4. Id. at 1386. The opinion does not mention why the Browns decided to turn around.
In her brief, Jill Brown indicated they were familiar with the checkpoint and had been
delayed and harassed there before. Seeking to avoid a repeat of that situation, they turned
around and returned to Texas, See Brief for Respondent at 6 n.6, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997)
(No. 95-1100).
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restraining technique. Mrs. Brown fell to the ground and severely
injured her knees. She underwent corrective surgery for her injury and
ultimately may need knee replacements.'
Mrs. Brown brought suit against Deputy Burns in federal court under
Section 1983 alleging that his use ofexcessive force deprived her of her
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.' She also sued
Bryan County and its sheriff, B.J. Moore, for his decision to hire Burns
as his deputy and for providing Burns with inadequate training.7 Bryan
County stipulated that all hiring decisions made by the sheriff's
department were made by Sheriff Moore and that he was empowered to
make policy for the county regarding the sheriff's department.8
At trial it was revealed that Burns was the son of Sheriff Moore's
nephew. Sheriff Moore testified that before he hired Burns, he received
a copy of his criminal and driving records. Burns had previously
pleaded guilty to assault and battery, public drunkenness, resisting
arrest, and numerous driving offenses. Despite Burns's criminal record,
Sheriff Moore decided to hire him as a deputy sheriff. The sheriff
testified that he had not examined the criminal history very closely but
was aware that his relative had been arrested before. The jury found
Burns liable for using excessive force against Mrs. Brown. It also found
Bryan County and its sheriff liable for the decision to hire Burns and for
failing to provide him with adequate training in the use of force.9
The County appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against Burns,
and upheld liability against the County for both inadequate training and
the decision to hire Burns despite his criminal record."0 The United

5. Id. at 1386-87.
6. Id. at 1387. The use of excessive force by police officers presents a deprivation of
Fourth Amendment rights actionable under Section 1983. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 816-17 (1985). Both the individual officer who uses excessive force and the
municipality that oversees the officer may be held liable. The municipality is only liable
in these situations, however, if it maintains a policy or custom of using excessive force. See
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
7. 117 S. Ct. at 1387. Inadequate training of police officers creates Section 1983
liability if the dearth of training shows a deliberate indifference to the federal rights of
those with whom police are likely to come into contact. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
8. 117 S. Ct. at 1387. A claim against an official municipal policymaker is tantamount
to a claim against the municipality itself. Because Sheriff Moore was empowered by the
county to make decisions relating to the sheriff's department, Bryan County could properly
be held liable for Moore's conduct while acting in his official capacity. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
9. 117 S. Ct. at 1387.
10. Id.
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to determine whether a
municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 for failing to screen
the background of an employee who later commits a constitutional
tort." The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit decision and held
that Section 1983 liability theoretically could be premised on a negligent
hiring decision but that Burns's history did not provide sufficient
warning that he was likely to use excessive force after he was hired. 2
Consequently, the County could not be held liable for Burns's use of
excessive force against Mrs. Brown."3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
the Supreme Court held that a municipality was
In Monroe v.
not a "person" for purposes of Section 1983 litigation and thus was not
subject to liability under that statute. 5 The Court noted Congress had
specifically rejected an amendment to the statute that clearly included
municipalities within its purview."6 The Court concluded that Congress
must have doubted its constitutional power to "impose civil liability on
municipalities" and therefore never intended Section 1983 to cover those
entities."
That interpretation of Section 1983 proved to be short lived. In Monell
v. Department of Social Services,' s the Court overruled the portion of
Monroe that foreclosed municipal liability. 9 Monell concerned a
Section 1983 claim against New York City by pregnant city employees
who were forced to take maternity leave before it was medically
necessary. The City argued that it could not be held liable under the
holding in Monroe."0 Reversing Monroe, the Court determined that
Congress intended to include local governmental bodies within the ambit
of Section 1983 but only for those actions directly traceable to a
Pape,4

11. Id. The Court declined to review the inadequate training ground, agreeing with the
Fifth Circuit that it did not merit review. Id. The term "constitutional tort" is used to
refer to both a deprivation of constitutionally secured rights and those rights afforded by
federal statutory law. Both types of deprivation are actionable under Section 1983. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1997).
12. 117 S. Ct. at 1387.
13. Id. at 1394.
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
15. 365 U.S. at 187.
16. Id. at 190-91.
17. Id. at 190.
18. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
19. Id. at 663.
20. Id. at 660-62.
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Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
municipal decision.2
concluded the issue was one of causation.22 The text of Section 1983,
Brennan noted, speaks of one who "subjects, or causes to be subjected"
a third party to a deprivation of federal rights.2" If a municipality
causes a constitutional violation, then it may properly be held liable.
However, a municipality is not liable simply because it hires or employs
a tortfeasor. Ultimately, Brennan concluded, the theory of respondeat
superior could not be used to subject a municipality to liability for the
constitutional torts of those under its charge; the causation nexus was
too tenuous.24 Liability must be predicated on more than a simple
employer-employee relationship. It must be traceable to a decision
attributable to the governmental body. The decision of the municipality
or its duly authorized agent must be the "moving force" behind the
deprivation of federal rights.' A policy or custom promulgated by an
official policymaker served that end. 6 With that, the enigmatic
"policy" requirement was born.
The issue of causation continued to dominate questions of municipal
liability. The Court confronted a relatively easy causation question in
Owen v. City of Independence.' In Owen the city council voted to
release damaging reports about a city employee to the news media, and
the next day the city manager fired the employee without a pretermination hearing.2 The Court concluded that those actions satisfied the
Monell causation requirement because the constitutional deprivation was
visited on the employee directly by the entity itself.29 The city council's
action clearly showed an official "policy" that caused the employee's
constitutional deprivation.

21. Id. at 690.
22. Id. at 692.
23. Id. at 691 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
24. Id. Justice Brennan's conclusion rested on the statutory language of Section 1983
but also derived from a concern that federalism barriers would be implicated by the
imposition of respondeat superior liability on municipalities. See id at 692-93.
25. Id. at 694.
26. Id. To implicate a municipality, a decision that results in a Section 1983 violation
must be made by a policymaker authorized to make those decisions. The issue of
authorization is governed by state law. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,
737 (1989).
27. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981). In Newport the city council voted to cancel a concert because it did not like the
band scheduled to perform. The concert promoter brought a Section 1983 action against
the municipality. The Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the promoter and found no
difficult causation issues were implicated. Id. at 253 n.7.
28. 445 U.S. at 633-34 n.13.
29. Id.
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In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,s° a majority of the Court determined that a single decision properly attributable to a municipality
could constitute a "policy" giving rise to municipal liability.3' The
Court fractured, however, on when the decision was properly attributable to the entity.32 That question was easily answered when an
officially pronounced rule was put forth by the entity, the, situation in
Monell. Similarly, facially unconstitutional actions taken by an entity's
governing body were properly attributable to the entity itself, which was
the case in Owen. However, in Pembaurthe conflict was less clear. An
assistant county prosecutor authorized the police to conduct an
unconstitutional search of a local doctor's office.' Seeking to avoid the
respondeat superior liability that the decision in Monell eschewed, the
plurality grappled with whether this decision, made by a county
employee, could be said to represent municipal policy.'M Finding the
answer in state law, the Court determined that a state statute specifically authorized a local prosecutor to establish policy in certain law
enforcement areas." Therefore, a majority of the Court concluded that
the prosecutor's decision could indeed bind the county and allowed the
action against the government to proceed.' Once that was determined,
the Court was convinced that the case presented no difficult causation
questions. The Court concluded that the prosecutor's decision to
authorize the police to search "directly caused the violation of petitioner's
Fourth Amendment rights." 3
After Monell the most difficult causation issue the Court confronted
emerged in City of Canton v. Harris."M Mrs. Harris was arrested by the
Canton Police Department and taken to the local police station. When
she arrived, she began to experience medical problems. Her speech was
slurred, and she fell down several times in the presence of city police
officers. The police determined that she did not need medical attention,
and she was left lying on the floor of the station. After she was released
from police custody, she was transported by ambulance to a hospital
where she remained for a week. She brought suit against the City and
its police department alleging that police officers were inadequately

30.

475 U.S. 469 (1986).

31. Id. at 480. Although Pembaurwas a plurality decision, this recognition was made
in a section of the opinion in which a majority of the Court joined.
32. Id. at 481-82.
33.

Id. at 473.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 484-85.
Id&at 485.
Id. at 484.
489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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trained in determining whether detainees needed medical attention. A
jury found the City liable for inadequate training. 9
The Supreme Court determined that a city could be held liable for
inadequate training if its training policy, or omission thereof, constituted
"deliberate indifference" to the federal rights of citizens with whom the
police would likely interact.4" The Court held that "deliberate indifference" was a "policy" of inaction.4 1 Accordingly, the policy hurdle was
cleared if a municipality did nothing in the face of an obvious recurring
need for more training.4 2 A "policy" of inadequately training officers
could be viewed as the cause of a constitutional deprivation. For the
first time, a majority of the Court held that a "policy" need not be
unconstitutional on its face." The City of Canton's training program,
if viewed in a vacuum, was certainly constitutional." But as applied,
it could be viewed as the moving force behind the deprivation of Mrs.
Harris's federal rights.4 The Court remanded the case to allow Mrs.
Harris47 the chance to establish the "deliberate indifference" standard at
trial.
After Harris the contours of municipal liability under Section 1983
were reasonably well established. A "policy or custom" clearly attributable to a municipality was required, and respondeat superior liability
A single decision could suffice as a "policy," 49 and
was forbidden.'
whether an employee was empowered to render policy was a question of
state law.' 0 Municipal inaction in the face of obvious need could be
construed as a policy choice giving rise to liability, and the policy need
not be unconstitutional on its face."1 Ultimately, a municipality was
liable for only those violations that it caused, and causation was

39. Id. at 381-82.
40. Id. at 388.
41. Id. at 389.
42. Id at 390.
43. Id. The Court noted that if a municipality is to be held liable, the causal link must
be established by the evidence, and the constitutional violation must derive from
inadequate training and not from the shortcomings of an individual officer. Id. at 390-91.
44. Id. at 387.
45. Id. at 386.
46. Id. at 390.
47. Id at 392-93. The Court indicated that under the facts of the case, it was unlikely
she could do so. Id. at 392.
48. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 691.
49. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480.
50. Id. at 484-85. See also Jett, 491 U.S. at 737.
51. Harris,489 U.S. at 387.
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generally a jury question.5 2 Onto this legal landscape entered the
decision in Brown.

III. THE RATiONALE OF THE COURT
Writing for a five to four majority, Justice O'Connor delivered the
opinion in Brown." She began by reviewing the legacy of Section 1983
decisions pertaining to governmental liability rendered by the Court
since the seminal decision in Monell." What was crucial in those
cases, Justice O'Connor wrote, was the distinction between cases in
which fault was easily attributable to a municipality and those in which
it was not.5 5 Reiterating Monell's "policy" argument, the majority
opinion emphasized that anything less than the application of rigorous
standards of culpability and causation would result in respondeat
superior liability.'
The Court characterized the prior line of cases as falling into three
distinct categories. Comprising the first are cases like Owen, in which
a governmental body causes a constitutional violation by passing a
facially illegal act.57 Causation and fault are clear in those situations,
and a municipality is plainly not subjected to vicarious liability." The
second class includes those situations in which an employee authorized
by state law to act for the entity performs some facially illegal act.
Provided that the employee is indeed authorized to act for the municipality, those situations do not give rise to complex fault questions.5 " The
policymaker becomes the entity because the entity has authorized
another to bind it. In this type of situation, it is proper to hold the
government liable for the actions of those who operate it, and once again
causation and fault are easily determined.' The final class, Justice

52. Id.,at 391.
53. Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1385.
54. Id. at 1387-89.
55. Id. at 1389.
56. Id. Before turning to the applicable legal standards applied in a negligent hiring
case, the Court disposed of the issue that had generated so much debate in Pembaur.
Bryan County stipulated that the sheriff was authorized to make policy for the county for
the sheriffs department. Thus, the difficult question of whether the decision of an
employee could bind the entity was dispensed with. For purposes of the suit, the Court
concluded Sheriff Moore was Bryan County. Any decision he made could be construed as
county policy and would be fully capable of binding the municipality. Id. at 1390 (citing
Jett, 491 U.S. at 701).

57. Id. at 1389 (citing Owen, 445 U.S. 622; Newport, 453 U.S. 247).
58. Id.
59.

Id. (citing Pembaur,475 U.S. at 481).

60. Id
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O'Connor wrote, includes those situations in which a policymaker
performs an act that is not itself unlawful but still results in a constitutional violation."' It was in this third class of cases that Sheriff
Moore's decision to hire Deputy Burns must fall. Because causation and
fault are more tenuous, those situations must be rigorously examined2 to
ensure a municipality is not held liable for acts beyond its control."
Although it might appear that the holding in Harrisshould dictate the

outcome in Brown, Justice O'Connor concluded that the analogy between
the two cases was inappropriate." In Harris the Court determined
that the failure to train police could give rise to liability because the
"deliberate indifference" to training needs could be expected to have
obvious consequences, namely the deprivation of the federal rights of
citizens at the hands of inadequately trained police." Precisely
because the result of failing to train officers was predictable, it was
proper to hold the municipality liable for its omissions." But the
failure to adequately screen the background of an employee had much
less predictable consequences. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor noted,
failure to screen cases and failure to train cases were simply not the
same, and the application of the Harris approach in Brown was
improper." Otherwise, stringent standards of causation and fault
would be impermissibly relaxed.
Because failure to screen cases presented the greatest likelihood that
a municipality would be held liable for acts that it did not commit, the
Court held that entity liability could attach only in very limited
circumstances."' The plainly obvious consequence of a decision to hire
must be that the hired employee would commit a specific constitutional
violation. The applicant's background must demonstrate a specific
tendency to deprive citizens of federally secured rights in a predictable
way." Indeed, the applicant's past must suggest that if hired he is
"highly likely to inflict the particularinjury suffered by the plaintiff.'
Although Deputy Burns's criminal record indicated that he might not be
the best choice for the position of deputy sheriff, it did not suggest that

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id at
Id at

1389-90 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. 378).
1390.
1391 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. 378).

1393-94.
1391-92.
1392.
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the plainly obvious consequence of a decision to employ him would be
that he would use excessive force on citizens.7"
The Court further noted that a complete failure to review the
background of an applicant could not alone establish the requisite level
of municipal culpability.71 This would merely show indifference to the
employee's background, not the requisite indifference to the rights of
citizens whom the employee was likely to encounter.72 Only by
reviewing the applicant's history, observing a specific tendency to violate
citizens' rights, and still hiring the applicant can the municipality be the
moving force behind the constitutional violation.73
The Court concluded that a review of Deputy Burns's background did
not establish that the plainly obvious consequence of Sheriff Moore's
decision to employ him would be a high risk that Burns would use
excessive force on citizens.74 Consequently, the trial court improperly
allowed the failure to screen claim to go to the jury, and the Court
remanded the case in light of that determination.75
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer,
noted that the Court had held as a matter of law that Burns's record of
violent misdemeanors was insufficient to establish that he would use
excessive force on civilians. 76 Disagreeing with the majority, Justice
Souter argued that excessive force was precisely the type of conduct that
Burns's history predicted.77 He concluded that the Court articulated
a new standard more stringent than the Harris"deliberate indifference"
test and that it applied the standard with such a high level of skepticism
that it was tantamount to a complete bar on municipal liability for
failing to screen an applicant's history.7 There was ample evidence in
the record for a jury to conclude that Sheriff Moore had read Burns's
entire history and hired him anyway." Further, there was ample
evidence in the record for a jury to conclude that even under the Court's
new articulation, Burns's history predicted precisely the conduct that he
was accused of committing.' Justice Souter concluded that the Court's
skepticism, its abrogation of the role of the jury, and its articulation of

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1393.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1394.
Id. at 1393-94.
Id. at 1394 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1397 n.3.
Id. at 1396-97 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10).
Id. at 1399.
Id. at 1398-99.
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a standard of fault that seemed impossible to meet in practice compelled
his dissent. s
Writing for Justices Ginsberg and Stevens, Justice Breyer's dissent
called for the Court to reexamine the holding in Monell that disallowed
respondeat superior hability.8 2 The Court, Justice Breyer noted, had
created so many fine distinctions between the "policy" requirement and
vicarious liability that the law had become impossible to apply." The
decison in Brown was exactly the type of overly complicated analysis
that resulted from that legacy."I Justice Breyer concluded that in
addition to being too complicated, the decision in Monell was also
probably wrong.85 The disallowance of respondeat superior liability on
municipalities was neither required by the text of Section 1983 nor
mandated by constitutional principles of federalism." Accordingly,
Justice Breyer suggested the Court should revisit Monell and rethink its
premises."7
M IMPLICATIONS
The principle legacy of the decision in Brown is likely to be a profound
sense of skepticism by trial courts that a municipality can be held liable
for acts that are not unconstitutional on their face. This is the result
that Justice Souter warned about in his dissent where he described the
majority opinion as "skepticism gone too far."s
Additionally, Brown has created some confusion about whether it is
possible for a single decision made by an official policymaker to
constitute a policy under Monell.ss This is important because it
implicates a central premise behind Harristhat a single act can trigger
municipal liability if the single act constitutes "deliberate indifference"
to the rights of citizens.

81. Id. at 1396, 1398.
82. Id. at 1401 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has consistently supported the
view that Monell was wrongly decided and the imposition of respondeat superior liability
on municipalities would further the purpose of Section 1983. He has been the lone voice
in a series of opinions calling for a reexamination of the essential holding of Monell. He
now appears to have some company. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 148
n.1 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1401.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1401-02.
87. Id. at 1401.
88. Id. at 1398 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. See Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Further, although Harrisseemingly put to rest the issue of whether
acts that were not unlawful when authorized could constitute the basis
of Section 1983 liability, Brown has unsettled that aspect of the holding
in Harris.90 While the Court concluded in Brown that facially lawful
acts by municipal pohcymakers could, in theory, result in liability, the
required factual predicate is unlikely to emerge outside the theoreticaL
This is particularly true in the area of inadequate screening
cases. While a municipality might hire a police officer with a "Dirty
Harry" past who promptly engages in the use of excessive force and
subjects the entity to liability under Brown, it is unlikely. Much more
likely is that which was deemed insufficient under the facts of Brown:
no one screens the applicant at all, or if they do, the applicant's
background shows a generalized history of lawlessness. The Court in
Brown specifically rejected those scenarios as the basis for Section 1983
liability and concluded that respondent failed to show the likely
consequence of the decision to hire would be a specific constitutional
violation."2 Most non-Supreme Court members of the population,
however, would probably conclude that given Deputy Burns's past, it was
just a matter of time before he deprived a citizen of his constitutional
rights. If the facts of Brown will not support a jury finding of liability
for a failure to screen claim, what will? Realizing the answer to that
question is "not much," most trial courts are likely to view failure to
screen cases with a skepticism that is both in theory, and in practice,
fatal.
Moreover, the standard of culpability for an omission claim articulated
by the Court in Brown certainly seems to be a new and more stringent
standard than the test described in Harris." The seeds of the Brown
test were sown in Justice O'Conner's concurring opinion in Harris.'
That concurrence appears now to command a majority of the Court. The
risks from municipal omissions must now be both "plainly obvious" and
result in specific violations of the Constitution."' As Justice Souter
noted, the specificity requirement in Brown is distinct from the standard
described in the majority opinion in Harris." The decision in Harris

90.
91.
92.
93.
(1997)
94.
95.
96.

Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1396 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1391.
Id. at 1392-93.
See West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 337
(comparing the standard in Brown and the standard in Harris).
Harris,489 U.S. at 395-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392.
Id. at 1397 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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spoke of general violations of the Constitution and not the particularized
violations that emerged in Brown.9"
The specificity requirement also suggests that another aspect of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Harris may now be important.
Predicting specific violations of the Constitution would seem to require
that the underlying constitutional right must have been clearly defined
by prior case authority."
This requirement, suggested by Justice
O'Connor in Harris," is similar to the clearly established analysis
available to individuals under the qualified immunity inquiry.1"0 Of
course, because entities are not entitled to qualified immunity, the
Brown specificity test has created some tension between the Court's
disallowance of qualified immunity for entities and a requirement that
specific violations be predictable from municipal omissions. 1
The Court's skepticism in Brown represents a trend evident in most
post-Monell decisions implicating entity liability. The Court continues
to reduce Section 1983 claims that are appropriate for a jury's consideration."° The role of deciding an entity's exposure to Section 1983
liability has become almost exclusively a vehicle for summary adjudication."0 3 As a result, not only are entities free from vicarious liability,
but a "policy" that can withstand the Court's causation demands is
becoming exceedingly difficult to find. If that trend continues, the bar
that Monroe erected to municipal liability and that Monell purported to
tear down will rise again in a different form.
A final implication, born of the Court's love for fine distinctions in
municipal liability under Section 1983, is a willingness by at least three,
and possibly four, members of the Court to abandon Monell's policy
requirement as unworkable.' This group is apparently swayed by the
argument that anything this difficult to apply must have been wrong
from the outset.0 5 It remains to be seen whether a majority of the
Court will be willing to abandon Monell. Of course, that result would
represent a dramatic departure from the essence of Brown. The case

97. Harris,489 U.S. at 388; Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1393 n.1.
98.

101-04
99.
100.
101.
102.

See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CmIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

(1997).
Harris,489 U.S. at 396-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40('1987).
See Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.
See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1992).
103. Id. at 805.
104. Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1400 (Souter, J., dissenting), 1401 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. The lower courts have tended to view the standards as extremely difficult to apply.
See Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992).
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represents a willingness by the Court to hold a municipality liable under
Section 1983 only under rigorous standards of causation and fault. It
would be ironic indeed if Brown signaled the beginning of a move to
impose vicarious liability on municipalities for the constitutional torts
of their employees, precisely the liability that the Brown majority sought
so desperately to avoid.
JEFF HARIS

